In this paper we consider the notion of deadlines in the context of dense time. We show that obligations and actions are essential elements for the specication of deadlines. These notions can be relatively easily combined when a discrete temporal framework is used. However, we show that, once a dense time is introduced, several problems appear. In solving these problems we cannot use the same framework and denitions as used for the discrete time. In the new framework we use a branching dense temporal framework as a basis to specify both actions and obligations. Finally we show that all types of deadlines that were dened for the discrete temporal framework can also be dened for dense time.
Introduction
In [6] w e h a v e already argued that it is important t o b e able to specify deadlines in a declarative w a y for e.g. agent applications. In this way it is possible for the agent to reason about the deadlines before the planning process determines the next (sequence of) action(s). Deadlines cannot be modeled as hard constraints because:
It is not always possible to keep all deadlines at the same time (they are logically inconsistent).
the agent does not always have control over all actions (or conditions).
Therefore we propose the introduction of deontic logic in which it is possible to reason about states in which obligations are not fullled.
It is also clear that deadlines involve a temporal element and an action element. Every deadline species some temporal condition before which an action has to be performed. Therefore the modeling framework should contain some type of action descriptions as well as some temporal concepts.
In [6] w e h a v e shown how temporal operators can be added to the dynamic logic framework to model deadlines. This can be done relatively easy in the case of a discrete temporal framework. In that case actions are performed in lockstep and the duration of an action is one or more time units.
In some cases a discrete temporal framework does not suce to model the real world. This is the case when actions can occur at random moments in time and are time critical. Sampling at discrete intervals might mean that an action is discovered too late to react or it is not possible to set a new deadline accurately on the basis of the occurrence of the action. This happens for instance with the application of medicines to patients. It might be that a patient needs to be administered some medicine before 10 minutes have elapsed. After the medicine has been given another medicine should be given within 5 minutes. If we set the time frame to ve minutes this simple example can already go wrong. Although each example can be remedied by c hoosing the granularity of the time intervals smaller it is often dicult beforehand to determine which is the smallest interval that will suce for all cases in a certain application. In these cases it is worthwhile to explore the use of continuous (or dense) time.
In [7] we explored the possibilities to combine obligations with a temporal framework based on continuous time. In this case the Kripke structures that function as semantics for dynamic logic cannot function as a basis for the combination anymore. This is due to their inherent discrete nature. Therefore we h a v e to use a model for continuous temporal logic as a basis for the combination. On top of such a temporal model we h a v e to construct an action logic, because the representation of (combinations of) actions is essential for the description of deadlines.
In [7] we already sketched some other approaches that combine temporal and deontic logics. We will recapitulate them here briey. The approaches described in e.g. [18, 13, 10, 8 , 9 ] tend to express the deontic concepts/operators in terms of temporal concepts/operators. This is the most obvious in the approach o f [ 1 0 ] where obligation is viewed as a kind of liveness condition: something will happen sometime in the future. In our view such a reduction is not appropriate, since the notions of obligation and liveness express quite dierent properties conceptually: liveness expresses that something will denitely happen while an obligation expresses that something should happen (it is desirable that something happens) but in fact might never happen at all! Also the other timebased approaches are quite dierent from what we are aiming at in this paper. For instance, Thomason [18] uses a reduction of obligation to truth in all future courses of action/time that are morally acceptable, and Horty [13] considers a branching-time framework and denes obligations on the basis of the choices available to the agent and`stit' (seeing to it that) constructs (cf. [4] ). Finally, V an Eck [ 8 , 9] employs a temporal necessity operator 2 t that is evaluated with respect to a set of (linear) time structures (`world courses' in the terminology of Van Eck): 2 t ' means that in every world course that is the same up to t (and not including t) the formula ' is true. From this denition one easily observes that anything that is true in the past (i.e. before time t) i s necessarily true. Philosophically this is defended as follows: since the past cannot be changed, there are no other possibilities than what actually happened, so this happened necessarily. F urthermore, Van Eck considers in [9] obligations of the form 'O t expressing that in all world courses that are possible from time t onwards and are as perfect as possible{given that ' is the case in them{ is the case.
Van Eck uses these modality ideas to solve contraryto-duty paradoxes such as a certain (the`Suzy Mae' or forward') version of the Chisholm paradox [ 5 , 16] . The notions of temporal necessity and obligation as considered by V an Eck are very dierent from our temporal and deontic operators. Van Eck's obligation may b e viewed as a temporal variant of a (deontic) conditional, whereas our obligation operator has no such a v our.
We will use a dynamic obligation based on the one dened in [14] . Also we try to add a temporal dimension to these dynamic obligations instead of expressing the obligations in terms of some temporal operators.
This paper should be viewed as a rst experiment t o express deadlines in a (branching) dense time. We d o not give an axiomatization for this logic or even a set of inference rules. Therefore automatic reasoning with the specications is not yet possible.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First we will discuss the topic of action description in a dense temporal framework where obligations are used. In section 3 we describe the dynamic obligations within a branching dense temporal framework. We also discuss the topic of persistence of violations in this framework. In section 4 we describe the deadlines that were already dened in [6] in this new framework. It appears that some denitions become more perspicious and elegant in this new setting! Section 5 contains some conclusions and directions for further research.
2 Action description in a temporal framework
It is clear from the above that the notion of action is important in our framework. We cannot take just any action representation, because we also want to be able to represent combinations of actions and their eects (as could be done in dynamic logic). This is especially important because we represent the obligation to perform an action in dynamic deontic logic (DDL) as:
Which means that is obliged i not performing leads to a state in which V , standing for violation, holds. In order to keep this intuitive denition of the dynamic obligation in the combined logic we h a v e t o be able to represent negations of actions. In a framework with continuous time a common way to represent actions with durations is to dene momentaneous actions that mark the start and end point o f the actual action. E.g. writing an article would be represented by the following formula: start(write article; t)f inish(write article; t + duration(write article)) Some care should be taken to ensure that the action denoting the nishing of the actual action is linked to the right starting action. However, using this formulation leads to the following representation of the obligation of writing an article:
O(start(write article; t)f inish(write article; t + duration(write article))) which (in all deontic systems) is equal to:
O(start(write article; t))Ô (finish(write article; t + duration(write article))) The problem is that the obligation of writing the article is translated to two separate obligations. Do I violate the obligation of writing the article if I do not start it at time t but still adhere to the obligation to nish it in time? If the obligation on the action is geared to an obligation on the result of the action, we are only interested in the nishing action. If the obligation is really meant to enforce performing the action, we are only interested that the obligation to start the action has been fullled. It appears that this type of action description is not suitable when we w ant to express obligation on actions as well.
An alternative approach to describe actions in a temporal framework is given by Allen [1] . He uses temporal intervals as primitives in the logic. Therefore the representation of writing an article becomes:
OCCUR(write article; t) where t stands for an interval. Now the obligation on an action is represented in an atomic way:
O(OCCUR(write article; t)); where we assume O to be a standard`ought-to-be' obligation operator (as in standard deontic logic, cf. e.g. [15] ). However, we n o w h a v e the problem that the obligation also seems to include the specic interval during which the action is supposed to occur. When is the above obligation violated? Formally this happens when :OCCUR(write article; t) is true. However, this can be true due to two reasons:
1. The article is not written 2. The interval t is not correct (too small or large) Intuitively a violation of the obligation to write the article means that the article is not written. The interval (time) that it takes to write the article should be intrinsic to the action. However, formally, it seems difcult to prevent the violation on the basis of a`wrong' interval.
It appears from the observations given above that the type of representation that should be used for action descriptions depends on the way the actions are used within obligations. Therefore some of the usual ways to describe actions in a temporal framework are not appropriate when used in combination with obligations. We will show in section 3, how actions can be represented such that the usual properties of obligations are preserved also in this framework. One important aspect in this respect is the use of branching time for the temporal framework. The branching time semantics is needed to`simulate' the branching nature that is inherent in the Kripke models of dynamic logic.
Besides the problem of how to represent`simple' actions in a temporal framework with continuous time in the presence of obligations, we address two questions that did not arise concerning the representation of combinations of actions in a framework with discrete time. The rst issue has to do with choices between actions. In a discrete time framework the actions are performed in one step. (Every action that takes more time is split into a sequence of subactions). Therefore, performing + means that either has been performed or has been performed after one time step. However, in a framework with continuous time one might perform + by starting with then stopping and starting right a w a y , etc. All the while one is performing either or but even after the time it would cost to perform followed by one might not have nished either one of them.
A second issue is the synchronisation of parallel actions. If all actions have equal length then performing & means performing and at the same time until they are both nished. However, if takes less time to perform than then it is not possible to say that performing & means performing them both at the same time until they are nished. During some time is nished while is still performed.
We do not intend to solve all these issues in a generic way in this paper, but will give a n i n tuitive denition of obligations on all types of actions. This will form the basis of the denition of the deadlines given in section 4.
3 Obligations in a dense temporal logic
In this section we will investigate how the concepts of dynamic deontic logic as dened in e.g. [14] can be expressed in a temporal framework. Extending the notion of action to dense time means adding duration. This is achieved by i n troducing two new state predicates, DOING(), which denotes that action is being performed and DONE() which denotes that in the timepath that led to the state where it is evaluated, has been performed as the last action. At rst sight it might seem superuous to introduce both a DO and a DOING predicate. Consider, however, the case that O() is NOT satised, because in the moment following the state where O() is demanded the execution of does not commence. This should be noticable immediately, but because has duration, the evaluation of DONE() can only take place after enough time has expired for to have completed. Hence the introduction of DOING(), not so much to enable noticing that is being executed, but rather to sense that it isn't by means of the expression :DOING().
The actions that have to be performed before the deadlines can also be composite. The operators that combine the actions are + for a choice between actions, & for parallel execution of actions,for the negation of an action and ; for the sequence of actions.
Based on these operators and a set A = fa; b; c; :::g of basic actions we can dene a set Act of action expressions by the following BNF:
:: xj 1 + 2 j 1 & 2 jj 1 ; 2 With x 2 A.
We assume the following equivalences for the DOING and the DONE operator: ( 2 ) 5. DONE( 1 & 2 ) = DONE( 1 )^DONE ( 2 ) 6. DONE() = : DONE() 7. DONE( 1 ; 2 ) = DONE( 2 )^Before( 2 )DONE( 1 ) We will not make the operator Before() explicit in this paper due to space and time constraints. However, it can be expressed in a quite natural manner using standard temporal operators. Furthermore, to avoid distracting technicalities we assume that each instance of an action is uniquely named. There are various well established ways to deal with duplicate instances of actions; a crude but straightforward way t o a v oid them is timestamping.
In the following subsection we give the syntax and semantics of the branching dense time temporal logic in which these concepts are embedded. Then we will indicate how the obligation on actions can be dened in this logic and which are the problems.
BTLcont syntax
There are various temporal operators possible, of which at the moment w e only need the until (U) and the operator A that stands for`all paths to the future'. The latter operator is needed to distinguish formulas that hold in all possible future paths and formulas that only hold in some future paths. A distinction typical for branching temporal logics. Besides the DOING and the DONE operator over actions we also introduce a PREFER operator that indicates of two actions which one is preferred to be performed (at a certain moment). This operator is used to model obligations that have to be performed as soon as possible but not before some more important or`preferred' actions have been executed. Denition 3.2 The set of BTLcont formulas is dened inductively, given a set P V(of Propositional Variables, including special ones true, false, and V).
1. every member of P Vis a formula; 5. if , are formulas, then so are A and (U ).
As in [6] w e can dene the derived operators 3 (eventually) and 2 (always from now) as follows:
3 := trueU; 2 := :3:;
These operators will be used later in the denition of deadlines.
BTLcont semantics
To obtain the semantics, we extend the evaluation function for one (implicit) world from the propositional case to an evaluation function dened for a tree of dense discrete paths of worlds; the ordering representing time.
Think of, for example, sequences of rational or real numbers as the worlds, the usual order as (time) relation). For a more extensive description of the logic, see [19] . Note that the index i is an element o f R 0 + , the positive real numbers plus 0. The index notation is maintained to provide a close connection to the more widely used integer based framework. Also note that we tacitly assume that technicalities like nite variability ( [3] ) have been taken care of.
BTLcont denition of obligation
In BTLcont w e can now try and propose a denition of obligation in the same spirit of the formula given in section 2 using dynamic logic. Denition 3.4 O() = def A(DOING()U(DONE()_V)) Intuitively this denition states that an action is obligated i along every time path it is the case that is being performed until either is nished (done) or we are in a violation state. The latter can be read equivalently that one is performing (doing) until a state is reached such that if there is no violation the action is nished, or again equivalently until a state is reached such that if the action is not done / nished we are in violation. This last reading is indeed very close to the reading of the denition of obligation in the dynamic logic setting.
In [6] the obligation to perform an action was expressed in terms of an obligation for a certain formula to hold:
O() = def [any]O(DONE()) which means that whatever you do now afterwards the formula DONE() is obliged to hold. In this logic we do not have the special violation predicates V , but have an O operator for formulas. Although this logic is richer in principle it also introduces many complications, because we h a v e to dene the truth value of O() for any formula . This involves the introduction of another semantic relation orthogonal to the temporal dimension. We a v oided these complications through the introduction of the violation predicate V , which can be seen as an abreviation of the formula: O(): This keeps the logic simpler and more adequate for our present purpose. However, the denition as in [6] could also be expressed easily in our present framework when we extend it with obligations over formulas in the following way:
Obligations on compound actions
We will in this section examine briey how the general denition given in the previous subsection works for compound actions. ( 2 )_V)) The only problem with this denition is that it is possible to swap between doing 1 and doing 2 until nishing one of them. Intuitively one would think that the choice about which action is performed is made at the start, after which that action should be performed completely. This anomaly cannot be repaired within the present framework. It needs an extra operator to enforce such a c hoice explicitly. W e leave this for further research. A(DOING( 1 )^DOING( 2 )U (DONE( 1 )^DONE( 2 )_V)) However, this is not at all intuitively correct. It implies that the actions 1 and 2 are having equal durations and can nish at exactly the same moment. This is not usually the case in a framework with continuous time. The same problem appears in the dynamic logic framework when action sequences with dierent length are combined. However, this problem is solved in that framework through the denition of the`[ ]' operator. This operator is also dened for conjunctions of sequences of actions of dierent lengths. Therefore we still have a good denition of []V for all there. We could try the same in the current framework by dening an operator After() which indicates that after the action has been performed the formula holds. This operator can then take care of actions with dierent lengths. However, the denition of this operator is not trivial and we will not pursue it in the present paper. In this place we will just give a new denition for the obligation on parallel actions: ( 1 ; 2 ) ) _ V )) where sh ( 1 ; 2 ) gives the shortest of the two actions and lo gives the longest of the two actions. The above denition states that rst 1 and 2 have to be performed in parallel until the shortest of the two is nished. After that the longest of the two should be continued until it is also nished.
Although not easy to prove w e still have that: ( 2 ) Next we look at the general denition of obligation applied to the negation of an action. The denition of O() becomes:
A(DOING()U(DONE()_V)) which is equivalent to:
A(:DOING()U(:DONE()_V)) Although the denition contains the performance of it seems not correct that this should only hold until :DONE(). This formula will hold almost always, except at the moment that has just been performed. Therefore this denition cannot be correct. A better denition for O() and the one we will use is:
Finally we c heck the general denition for the sequence of actions. Using the denition we get that O(; ) is equivalent to:
Because we did not give a formal denition for the operator Before() w e can not formally show that it is equal to the following intuitive denition of the obligation on a sequence of actions:
It should be clear, however, that the two denitions are intuitively equivalent.
Persistence of violations
In the introduction we h a v e argued that it is important to be able to reason about situations in which deadlines (i.e. obligations) have been violated. However, we h a v e not said anything about the persistence of the violation predicates. In the framework as it is now, the violation predicate V is true whenever an obligation has been violated. However, this is only the case for the moment directly after the violation occurred. This seems a bit strange, because it suggests that violations will disappear by themselves again, while in real life usually somè repair' action is needed to dissolve the violation.
The violations can be made persistent i n t w o w a ys. First it is possible to regenerate the violation for every point in time until the repair action is performed. This can be done by adding the following formula :
as an axiom to the logic. Now, when a violation occurs it implies an obligation to repair the violation. If the repair action is not performed this leads to a violation again, which in its turn leads to a new obligation, etc.
One will notice right a w a y that introducing persistence for the violation predicate also raises the question about the relation between the violation and the obligation that causes the violation. If several obligations are violated before any of them is repaired, we should have several violation predicates related to the dierent obligations. This can be easily remedied by making the violation predicate into a predicate over the action that causes the violation. I.e. we c hange the denition of the obligation to: O() = def A(DOING()U(DONE()_V())) Now the violations are uniquely determined and related to the event that causes them. The axiom above should then also be adjusted to read:
and we can close this by stating that:
Although the above construction is technically sound it looks a bit counterintuitive. Intuitively the violations are not generated constantly but just persist until the repair action is performed. We can catch this notion quite naturally and adequately by c hanging the denition of the obligation in the following way:
Where V p () = def (V ()U DONE(repair())). This is the denition as we will use it in the next section where we dene deadlines in terms of the obligations that are introduced in this section.
Obligations and deadlines
The rst thing that can be expressed using the temporal operators is an obligation to perform an action at some time in the future instead of right a w a y:
This means that along all possible futures either I will have performed at some point o r I h a v e a violation (now). Usually this denition of an obligation is too weak. It only states that the action should be performed sometimes, but this can be after an innite time. It resembles the`liveness' property as described in [10] . We can strengthen this denition in several ways. The rst is to demand that the action is performed before a certain condition becomes true. The denition for this type of obligation can be given as follows: The next type of obligation that we will describe is the periodic obligation. This obligation returns every time a certain condition holds true and should be fullled before another condition holds true. E.g. an order should be placed after the stock of computers has fallen below 15 and before the level has dropped below 5. The condition that the stock falls below a certain level will be true periodically (one hopes) and every time this happens an order for replenishment should be made. The periodic obligation is described as follows:
The box operator forces the obligation to be periodic. Every time (from now on) if becomes true the obligation arises to perform before .
An alternative denition would be:
This is closely related to the problems of conditional obligations. There are two w a ys to express conditional obligations:
Both have their merits and problems. We c hose for the rst formalization, because it seems most natural in our applications and causes fewer problems. The only counterintuitive aspect of this denition is that the starting condition of the obligation lays outside the scope of the O operator while the end condition of the obligation lays within the scope of the O operator. See [12] for a more thorough discussion on this topic.
In most cases the deadline is enforced only once (or explicitly reenforced every time it is needed). To ensure that the deadline only becomes active the rst time becomes true we extend the denition with an until clause that states that the obligation nishes after the rst time becomes true:
A second way to oblige an action to happen somewhere in the future without having to wait indenitely is to demand that the action is performed as soon as nothing`more important' or preferred is performed.
If quantication over actions is added to the language, this can be dened as follows: This obligation is interpreted as meaning that the action should be performed as soon as no other actions with a higher`preference' are performed. This obligation can be used when no strict deadline is given, but we w ant the action to be performed at some time. I.e. it has to be performed before an action with lesser importance is performed.
Up till now w e only described deadlines with an implicit time. Real time, i.e., a quantitative time treatment allowing us to specify numeric deadlines can be added to the above approach b y k eeping an explicit clock v ariable that stores the real time (cf. [11, 1 7 ] ). We distinguish between relative and absolute time conditions. For the absolute time conditions we i n troduce a special variable time. Using this variable we dene the general obligation with pure absolute temporal deadline as follows: O(now + t 1 < < ( now + t 1 ) + t 2 ) = def
This concludes the denition of all the types of deadlines that were also dened in [6] . In that paper we have already shown that these denitions are sucient to model most common deadlines.
Conclusions
Deadlines play an important role in exible transactions. In situations where several systems have to cooperate deadlines are a means to specify expectations of the behaviour of the other parties. In some situations the transactions are time critical (e.g. medical applications). For these situations a model with continuous time is needed to describe the deadlines. In this paper we h a v e i n v estigated what are the consequences of using dense (continuous) time for the specication of deadlines.
It appears that we can no longer use the model of dynamic logic as a basis for the combined model in which temporal, action and deontic concepts have t o be modeled. In the case of dense time we h a v e to take the temporal logic as a basis. Therefore we h a v e t o n d a representation of the actions in this logic. The fact that we also want to represent obligations over actions restricts the way the actions can be represented.
The logic that was presented in this paper complies to all constraints. However, the denition of obligation on actions is not compositional. I.e. there is no general denition that can be used for compound actions and that can be decomposed into obligations on the basic actions. That compositionality of operators on actions is a dicult problem in a dense time framework can also be seen in [2] . This problem is caused by the differing durations of the actions within the compound action. A solution might b e t o i n troduce an extra operator After() which w ould be the equivalent t o t h e 1060-3425/98 $10.00 (c)dynamic logic operator []. This operator can be used (as is done in dynamic logic) to isolate the problem of combinations of actions with dierent length from the obligation operator. The use of an explicit violation predicate related to the violated action makes it possible to reason about states in which deadlines are not kept. It is also easy to make these violations persistent. They will only disappear after a special`repair' action has been performed, which seems to comply with the intuitive meaning of violation and punishment.
An important area for further research is of course to dene an axiomatization of the logic and give some inference rules. Only when these things are achieved it will be possible to use this logic in practice.
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